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The non-tradable shares reform is an issue unique to the capital market in China. 
Since the foundation of securities market in China, non-tradable shares has been existed 
in listed companies, which has become an obstacle to the stable development of China’s 
securities market. Historically, the government had tried different ways to deal with the 
problem of non-tradable shares, including the trial floating of legal person’ shares, or the 
reducing holding of state-owned shares, but all of them failed in the end. On April 29, 
2005, with the passage of Circular on Issues relating to Pilot Reform of Listed 
Companies’ Non-Tradable Shares by China Securities Regulatory Commission, the pilot 
reform of non-tradable shares started, and it has been a milestone in the development 
history of China’s securities market.  
On the issue about how to reform non-tradable shares, a key element to the future 
development of China’ capital market, there are no precedent cases and experience to 
draw on, also no strong theories to support. Thus, how to design and set up reform plans 
is a key issue for the non-tradable shares reform and a puzzle for the scholars, investors 
and securities regulatory authorities. Now, research on the non-tradable shares reform is 
at the initial phrase, and no systematic, in-depth studies have been conducted. Given the 
importance of this issue and rarity of related studies, it is very important that theoretical 
and empirical research on Chinese listed companies’ non-tradable shares reform be 
conducted as soon as possible to strengthen the understanding this new object and to fill 
in gaps of research on this issue. 
Based on related literature and China’s reality, this paper will start with the unique 
viewpoint of the relationship between legal investor protection and listed companies’ 
ownership concentration, and analyze in detail whether ownership concentration will be 
affected by legal investor protection in China. Then, this paper will use Game Theory to 
probe the mechanisms that form compensation ratio. Finally, drawing on related theories, 
this paper will conduct a comprehensive research on the following issues: how to set up 
compensation ratio and the determinants of compensation ratio, what affect the choice of 
compensation methods, and how does the market react to the reformed firms in question. 
Thus, this paper develops a framework for studying Chinese listed companies’ 
non-tradable shares reform: why to reform non-tradable shares— how to reform 
non-tradable shares—the economic consequence of non-tradable shares reform. 
This paper consists of nine chapters. Major contents of each chapter are outlined as 
follow: 














issues under research, research ideas, research contents, and research improvements and 
innovations. 
Chapter2 is the literature review. In this chapter, the author reviews and comments 
on the literature about the relationship between legal investor protection and ownership 
concentration, the research on the non-tradable shares reform, “anchoring effect” and its 
related research. 
Chapter3 describes the institutional background of non-tradable shares reform of 
listed companies in China, including the origin of non-tradable shares, the characteristics 
of ownership structure, the problems that the non-tradable shares have brought, and what 
had been done to reform non-tradable shares in the history. 
Chapter4 studies the theory support to the non-tradable shares reform. Eepecially, 
this chapter will investigate the relationship between legal investor protection and 
ownership concentration. 
Chapter5, based on Game Theory, develop theoretical models about equilibrium 
compensation ratio to analyze the forming mechanism of compensation ratio. 
Chapter6 empirically examines the forming mechanism of compensation ratio and 
its determinants. In detail, this chapter uses the theory of “anchoring effect” in 
psychology to investigate two issues: whether there exists “anchoring effect” when 
setting up compensation ratio, and how strong the “anchoring effect” is. 
Chapter 7 examines what determine the choice of compensation methods. Based on 
related theories, this chapter comprehensively investigates the determinants and motives 
for the choice among different compensation methods and additional commitments by 
non-tradable-share holders. 
Chapter 8 examines the market reactions to the non-tradable shares reforms and 
factors that influence market reactions. Especially, this chapter will investigate how 
compensation ratio, additional commitment, as well as the interaction between these two 
affect market reactions. 
Chapter 9 sums up the research findings of this paper, and reports the lessons we 
learn, the caveats about this research, and points out the direction for further research. 
This paper has reached the following conclusions: 
1. Non-tradable shares, to a certain extent, not only lead to the result that ownership 
concentration does not decline as the improvement of legal investor protection, but also 
reduces the efficiency of legal investor protection. 
2. Negotiation ability of tradable-share holders and the anchor of compensation ratio 
are two key factors that influence equilibrium compensation ratio. The higher the anchor, 
the higher the equilibrium compensation ratio; but the relationship between negotiation 















What’s more, with government’s intervention, when the negotiation ability of tradable- 
share holders is too strong or too weak, the equilibrium compensation ratio will decrease. 
Thus, to some extent, intervention by the government may exacerbate the expropriation 
of tradable-share holders. 
3. As the reform progresses, the compensation ratios are more and more affected by 
other variables, but less and less affected by the “anchor”, so anchoring effect is getting 
weaker and weaker. Furthermore, the anchoring effect is strong for firms which offer low 
compensation ratio, but weak for firms which offer high compensation ratio. Thus, 
compensation ratio is set up irrationally by the reformed firms, there exists significant 
“anchoring and adjustment” biases. 
4. Mispricing is a key factor that influences the choice of compensation methods. 
The more overvalued is the firm, the higher the probability that the non-tradable-share 
holders will use the method of “paying shares” or “shrinking shares”. Also, risk and 
mispricing are two important determinants for the choice of different additional 
commitments by non-tradable-share holders. When the risk is higher, or the firm is more 
undervalued by the market, then the probability for the non-tradable-share holders to use 
(a) additional commitments, or (b) more additional commitments, or (c) more strict 
additional commitments, is higher. 
5. Unexpected compensation ratio, compensation ratio estimated from the viewpoint 
of tradable-share holders, and the degree of additional commitments, are three key 
factors that influence market reactions. The extent that the tradable-share holders got 
exceeds the expected compensation ratio, and the degree of additional commitments, are 
positively related to market reaction. But there is a significant “U” shape between market 
reaction and compensation ratio estimated from the viewpoint of tradable-share holders. 
This research is exploratory in nature; major improvements and innovations are 
evident in the following aspects: 
1. This paper has constructed the first set of “legal investor protection index” in 
China, which provides an analytical tool and testing method for other related research on 
legal investor protection in China. 
2. In terms of research framework, based on the reality of China’s non-tradable 
shares reform, this paper has, for the first time, presented three major topics requiring 
academic attention: why to reform non-tradable shares, how to reform non-tradable 
shares, and the economic consequence of non-tradable shares reform. It has also built a 
new framework for future study on listed companies’ non-tradable shares reform in 
China. 
3. Based on Game Theory and the reality that there may exist “anchoring effect” in 
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